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ABSTRACT 
SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER 
INCORPORATING EXTENSIBLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
by
Myung-Sun Kim 
University o f New Hampshire, May, 2007 
There are many methods that support user authentication and access control, 
important roles in the establishment of secure communication. Particularly, we examine 
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) and Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) and propose EAP-Advanced Encryption Standard-Pre-Shared-Key (EAP- 
AES-PSK). SASL is an authentication framework in connection-oriented protocols. EAP 
is an authentication framework providing multiple authentication methods. SASL is 
vulnerable to the dictionary attack, replay attack, and Man-In-The-Middle attack as well 
as the re-keying issue. We propose to incorporate EAP into SASL to enhance the security 
of SASL and to provide a pathway for easy incorporation of future EAP enhancements 
into SASL. Standalone EAP still faces some common attacks. We propose EAP-AES- 
PSK, a new EAP method, to provide strong authentication and we implement this method 
on the Cyrus SASL implementation: one of the publicly available SASL implementations. 
This project is evaluated through the verification of functionality o f a SASL application 
incorporating EAP. Further, we argue how the common security risks associated with 
SASL are addressed, and we complete a performance evaluation of the new method 
incorporated into SASL.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Authentication and access control of users are important functions in the 
establishment of secure communication. Both senders and receivers should be able to 
verify the identity the other party. However, successful authentication does not always 
occur over insecure network connections. One o f the commonly used authentication 
approaches is to authenticate via user identification (ID) and user password, or via host IP 
address. These methods are subject to the risks o f insecure communication when an 
intruder gains physical access of the communication medium between users and hosts, 
such as what occurs in the dictionary attack, replay attack, and Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) attack. Therefore, software developers must consider network security when 
they design and develop network enabled software programs.
Simple Authentication and Secure Layer (SASL) [17] protocol provides a 
straightforward solution for the software developer without a deep understanding of 
network security. SASL provides an authentication framework in connection-oriented 
protocols and a secure data transportation mechanism between a server and a client that is 
detached from existing application protocols. The SASL framework allows either new 
applications to reuse existing authentication protocol mechanisms or allows old 
applications to use new authentication protocols without requiring any modifications of
1
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the SASL library [17]. SASL has been incorporated into a few widely used protocols 
such as the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Post Office Protocol 3 
(POP3), the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), and Telnet to enable pluggable 
authentication [23], Currently, there are two publicly available SASL libraries: the Cyrus 
SASL library from Carnegie Mellon University and the GNU SASL library.
Even though SASL provides a standardized framework for an application 
supporting multiple authentication methods, the SASL authentication methods are 
vulnerable to many common attacks, such as dictionary attack, replay attack, and Man- 
In-The-Middle (MITM) attack, in addition to insecure data transportation. Therefore, we 
propose a method to protect against these attacks by integrating Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [2] into SASL.
EAP is an authentication framework providing multiple authentication methods. 
Since EAP is not a specific authentication mechanism, the exact authentication type is 
chosen by negotiating between a peer and an authenticator. EAP runs over data link 
layers where the Internet Protocol (IP) is not required, e.g., Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) 
[21] or Institute o f Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802 standard protocols. 
Currently, there exist over 40 different EAP methods [2] to provide strong authentication 
services and secure data transmission.
This document outlines the benefits and the problems in standalone SASL, 
followed by the advantages we will gain by combining EAP and SASL. Further, we 
present details on how to integrate EAP into SASL, so that SASL incorporating EAP 
addresses the existing weaknesses in SASL. This work builds upon a new EAP method, 
EAP - Advanced Encryption Standard - Pre-Shared Key (EAP-AES-PSK) that is an
2
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updated version of EAP - Transport Layer Security-Pre - Shared-Key (EAP-TLS-PSK) 
[14].
Cyrus SASL implementation, randomly chosen for this project, incorporates 
several types of plugins: mechanism plugins, user canonization plugins, and auxiliary 
property plugins. Mechanism plugins are for authentication methods. User canonization 
plugins are used to differ the ways o f canonizing authentication and authorization IDs. 
Auxiliary property plugins enable auxiliary properties about user credentials to be 
accessible, such as Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) services [18].
This project proposes to incorporate EAP into SASL to enhance security of SASL 
and to provide a pathway for easy incorporation of future EAP enhancements into SASL 
as well as to update and to implement EAP-AES-PSK. SASL incorporating EAP 
typically works by placing the EAP interface into the SASL library. The EAP interface 
not only bridges between the SASL library and existing SASL authentication methods, 
but also links the SASL library and future EAP authentication methods.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the architecture of SASL incorporating EAP including 
where the EAP interface is located in the SASL library directory and how the EAP 
interface connects SASL with legacy and future authentication methods. A more detailed 
explanation is presented in Chapter 2.
3
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Figure 1-1: SASL Incorporating EAP Abstract Layer
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
We present background details of Simple Authentication and Security Layer 
(SASL), Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), EAP-Pre-Shared Key (EAP-PSK), 
and EAP-Transport Layer Security-PSK (EAP-TLS-PSK).
2.1 Terminology
This document frequently uses the following terms:
Table 2-1: Terminology
AAA server The entity that provides Authentication, Authorization, 
and Accounting services to an authenticator. In this 
document, the terms "AAA server" and "authentication 
server" are used interchangeably. The authentication 
server is typically a Remote Authentication Dial-In User 
Service (RADIUS) server.
Authentication Key (AK) A static long-lived key, derived from the Pre-Shared Key 
(PSK), is to mutually authenticate the EAP peer and the 
EAP server [2].
Authentication The process to verify the user identity in a 
communication such as requiring to log in.
Client The end of the link that responds to the authenticator. 
This end is known as the supplicant in [12] and the peer 
in [2]. In this document, the terms "peer", "supplicant", 
and “client” are used interchangeably.
5
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Table 2-1 Continued
Extended Master Session 
Key (EMSK)
Additional keying material derived between the EAP 
client and server that is exported by the EAP method. The 
EMSK is at least 64 octets in length. The EMSK is not 
shared with the authenticator or any other third party. The 
EMSK is reserved for future uses that are not yet defined.
Key Derivation Key 
(KDK)
A static long-lived key, derived from the Pre-Shared Key 
(PSK), is to derive session keys [2].
Master Session Key 
(MSK)
Master Keying material that is derived between the EAP 
peer and server and exported by the EAP method. The 
MSK is at least 64 octets in length. In existing 
implementations, an AAA server acting as an EAP server 
transports the MSK to the authenticator.
Nonce A number used once, such as a random number.
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) A key in symmetric cryptography that is installed/sent to 
the opposite side of the connection in advance, or that is 
distributed by third party.
Server The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method 
with the peer. In the case where no backend 
authentication server is used, the EAP server is part of 
the authenticator. In the case where the authenticator 
operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is located 
on the backend authentication server.
Successful Authentication In this document, "successful authentication" is involved 
both authentication and authorization; even though the 
peer may pass authentication to the server, the peer may 
not have access to the server due to policy reasons [2], 
For instance, the peer has a basic services right on a 
server and the peer tries to access a premium services on 
the server. The peer successfully authenticates to the 
authenticator, but is not able to access to the server.
6
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2.2 Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
SASL is a framework to incorporate authentication in connection-oriented 
protocols and secure data transportation between a server and client that is detached from 
application protocols.
The SASL framework allows either new applications to reuse existing 
authentication protocol mechanisms, or allows old applications to use new authentication 
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Figure 2-1 illustrates the SASL abstract layer. Both client and server sides in the 
figure have three parts: an application, the SASL abstraction, and various plugins. The 
application is generally some connection-oriented protocol, such as Internet Message 
Access Protocol (IMAP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Post Office Protocol 
(POP), or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). Plugins contain database 
system and authentication protocol mechanisms. The SASL abstraction in the client and 
the server communicate to authenticate and authorize the connection, while the SASL 
abstraction monitors its application and plugins.
Both client and server sides in Figure 2-1 are symmetric; however, it is not 
required. For example, in the client side, database system SASL is not necessary because 
only the server side maintains user credential information within database systems. The 
client does not need to have all of the authentication methods that the server has available 
or vice-versa. When a client has only ANONYMOUS SASL method [24] that does not 
require authentication for guest access, SASL works fine if a server provides the 
ANONYMOUS SASL method with other authentication methods. However, if  the server 
does not support the ANONYMOUS SASL method, the server will not authenticate the 
client. In order to access a server, a client must have one of the authentication methods 
supported by the server.
GNU and Cyrus SASL libraries support the applications: LDAP, IMAP, SMTP, 
and POP, and provide several authentication methods such as ANONYMOUS (for 
unauthenticated guest access), PLAIN (a simple clear text password mechanism), LOGIN 
(a simple password mechanism), CRAM-MD5 (a simple challenge-response scheme
8
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based on HMAC-MD5 [7]), and EXTERNAL (for where authentication is implicit in the 
context).
Although SASL has many advantages, standalone SASL is vulnerable to many 
common attacks and insecure data transportation, in addition to re-keying issues, because 
many existing SASL mechanisms are vulnerable to these attacks and do not provide 
secure data encryption. Many of these attacks are addressed further in this chapter.
2.3 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
EAP was originally developed for the extensible usage o f authentication protocols 
defined in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [21], such as Password Authentication Protocol 
(PAP) [RFC 1334] and Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [22]. 
Figure 2-2 describes authentication protocols hierarchy [4],






Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP)
Generic Token Card (GTC)
One Time Password (OTP)
Figure 2-2: Authentication Protocols 
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EAP is an authentication framework providing multiple authentication methods. 
Since EAP is not a specific authentication mechanism, the exact authentication type is 
chosen by negotiation between a peer and an authenticator. EAP provides its own support 
for avoiding duplication and retransmission, but not fragmentation. However, standalone 
EAP is not secure enough to authenticate and has various vulnerabilities [2],
Since all traffic within EAP methods is exposed to attackers, user identities are 
visible. EAP is vulnerable to replaying packets, dictionary attack, disrupting negotiation, 
as well as other vulnerabilities described in [2]. Even though standalone EAP methods 
are not acceptable over wireless networks or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) due to 
those attacks, EAP is widely used in wired networks and Point-to-Point connections 
because EAP is an authentication framework, not a specific authentication mechanism. 
EAP provides a negotiation of the desired authentication mechanism [9]. A stronger 
authentication mechanism protects against the collection of vulnerable attacks while 
standalone EAP does not.
Figure 2-3 demonstrates an EAP message exchange. In EAP message exchanges, 
an EAP server requests user identity information from an EAP client and the client 
responds with the requested information back to the server. After the server obtains user 
identity information, more messages will be exchanged depending on the authentication 
process. The EAP server finally sends a message indicating whether the user 
authentication succeeds or fails.
In Figure 2-3 (b) including Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA), 
the authentication server provides AAA services designed for ease in tracking usage for 
billing and network statistics purposes. Authentication server clients transfer user
10
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credentials to the authentication server and the authentication server authenticates the 
user based on the provided credentials. The authentication server can be viewed as a kind 
of database and controller for usage billing and for network traffic management. 
However, this project mainly focuses on SASL and EAP, not on AAA services that the 
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Figure 2-3: (a) EAP Message Exchange without AAA,
(b) EAP Message Exchange
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Figure 2-4 describes an EAP packet format.




4 = M D5-Challenge
5 = OPT
6 = Generic Token Card
D ata /1 0 1 5  bytes
Identifier /1  byte






Code /1  byte
Figure 2-4: EAP Packet Format [2]
2.4 Extensible Authentication Protocol -  Pre-Shared Key (EAP-PSK)
A Pre-Shared Key EAP method (EAP-PSK) is one of the EAP methods that use 
PSK for mutual authentication and session key derivation. While EAP is a framework to 
authenticate, EAP-PSK is an actual authentication mechanism that utilizes PSK upon the 
EAP framework. EAP-PSK normally exchanges four messages in the authentication 
process between a client and a server. Once the authentication is successful, EAP-PSK 
provides a protected communication channel [5],
2.5 Extensible Authentication Protocol -  Transport Layer Security -
Pre-Shared Key (EAP-TLS-PSK )
EAP-TLS-PSK [14] is a new authentication method, EAP-PSK with TLS [6] 
tunneling support, as an EAP protocol that extends EAP-PSK, one o f the authentication 
protocols based on pre-shared keys. EAP-TLS-PSK uses secure tunnel establishment by
12
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TLS handshake to exchange authentication-related information between a client and a 
server, while EAP-PSK simply uses pre-shared keys to mutually authenticate. 
Authentication not based on certificates allows a reduced cost of management with fewer 
message exchanges between client and server.
EAP-TLS-PSK [14] consists o f two primary phases: Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) Handshake Phase and TLS Tunnel Phase. The TLS Handshake Phase is similar to 
the EAP-TLS [8] handshake Phase. Rather than using the EAP server to generate a 
required certificate, the process uses the EAP-PSK scheme to authenticate mutually and 
to establish the secure protected channel necessary for further connectivity.
In the TLS Tunnel Phase, further authentication takes place in the initially- 
established secure tunnel from the TLS Handshake Phase. EAP-PSK with tunneling 
employs the EAP-Type Length Value (EAP-TLV) method [11], allowing richer 
communication between client and server, to further authenticate EAP identity. At the 
conclusion of the TLS Tunnel Phase, MSK is derived using the TLS Pseudo Random 
Function (PRF) [8] from inner authentications that are mixed with the inner secret Key- 
Derivation Key (KDK) [5] from the TLS Handshake Phase and the TLS client and server 
random numbers to protect subsequent data.
2.6 Motivations and Goals
This project merges two technologies, SASL and EAP, to make the network more 
secure and introduces EAP-AES-PSK to provide strong authentication that is a new EAP 
method and will be built on SASL.
13
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SASL provides key security services to a number of application protocols such as 
e-mail protocols, so that software engineers can have a handy security tool. Software 
developers focus on only their application level, not communication security issues. 
Currently publicly available SASL libraries are the Cyrus SASL library by Carnegie 
Mellon University and the GNU SASL library. Both SASL libraries are used in IMAP, 
LDAP, POP, and SMTP to provide secure authentication.
EAP is widely being deployed in environments such as wireless networks and 
used over the Internet to support multiple authentication methods, such as token cards, 
one-time passwords, Kerberos (a network authentication protocol using secret-key 
cryptography) [13], and certificates. EAP-AES-PSK, described in Chapter 3, is a new 
strong authentication method that will be built on the SASL implementation.
SASL incorporating EAP typically works by locating the EAP interface in SASL 
plugins. The EAP interface not only bridges between the SASL library and existing 
SASL authentication methods, but also links the SASL library and future EAP 
authentication methods, still allowing future authentication methods to use existing SASL 
mechanisms if necessary.
We recall that Figure 1-1 illustrates the architecture o f SASL incorporating EAP 
including where the EAP interface is located in the SASL library directory and how the 
EAP interface connects SASL with legacy and future EAP authentication methods. This 
project proposes to incorporate EAP into SASL to enhance security of SASL and to 
provide a pathway for easy incorporation of future EAP enhancements into SASL.
In next chapter we propose an updated EAP-TLS-PSK which is called EAP - 
Advanced Encryption Standard - Pre-Shared-Key (EAP-AES-PSK).
14
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CHAPTER 3
EXTENSIBLE AUTHENTICATION 
PROTOCOL -  ADVANCED ENCRYPTION 
STANDARD -  PRE-SHARED KEY 
(EAP-AES-PSK)
We propose a new EAP method: EAP - Advanced Encryption Standard - Pre- 
Shared Key (EAP-AES-PSK) that is modified from EAP - Transport Layer Security - 
PSK (EAP-TLS-PSK) for two primary reasons: to reduce the number of message 
exchanges between the authenticator and the peer, and to ease the implementation and 
management of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) while maintaining the 
same security level that EAP-TLS-PSK provides.
TLS is a cryptographic protocol that provides many security algorithms. A peer 
negotiates for an algorithm that TLS supports. However, TLS specifies that no data must 
be sent when TLS initiates. Therefore, if  we want to continue to use TLS, we must 
modify the TLS implementation to be able to carry data in the initialization. We decided 
not to use TLS in order to ease the implementation and management, and the AES used 
in EAP-AES-PSK is one of the symmetric ciphers that TLS provides. As a benefit, there 
is no notoriously known attack in AES.
15
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At first glance, it may appear that EAP-AES-PSK is the same as EAP-PSK. EAP- 
AES-PSK is similar to EAP-PSK, but is not the same. EAP-AES-PSK intends to 
authenticate twice (in Phase 1 and Phase 2) to allow the use of password-based legacy 
EAP methods in Phase 2 of EAP-AES-PSK, as well as to provide more security. At the 
end of each phase, the end points generate an outer Master Session Key (MSK) and an 
inner MSK. From the outer and inner MSKs, EAP-AES-PSK derives a MSK to protect 
subsequent data. EAP-AES-PSK supports fragmentation and reassembly.
This chapter explains the details of EAP-AES-PSK and discusses the possible 
attacks and insecure data exchanges in the currently available Simple Authentication and 
Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms, which lead to the motivation for the study of this 
area.
3.1 Approach
EAP-AES-PSK, similar to other current EAP outer methods, consists of two 
primary phases. Phase 1 is similar to the EAP-PSK method. Rather than using the EAP 
server to generate a required certificate, the process uses the EAP-PSK scheme to 
authenticate mutually, generating a Transient EAP Key (TEK), to establish the secure 
protected channel necessary for further connectivity. At the beginning o f Phase 1, a 
server and a client derive the Authentication Key (AK) and the Key Derivation Key 
(KDK) from PSK [5] such as following pseudo code in Figure 3-1. Note that actual 
implementation should be more efficient since this pseudo code is to provide 
straightforward explanation.
16
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k e y s e t u p ( p s k ,  ...) {
c o u t n e r  = 0
s e t a k [ 1 6 ]  w i t h  Os
s e t k d k [16] w i t h  Os
a e s 1 2 8 ( p s k , a k ,  ...)
a e s 128 ( p s k , k dk ,  ...)
a k  A= c o u n t e r + +
kdk A= c o u n t e r
a e s 128 ( p s k , a k ,  ...)
a e s 128 ( p s k , k dk ,  ...)
}
Figure 3-1: Key Setup Algorithm in EAP-AES-PSK [5]
Both AK and KDK are 16 bytes. AK is used to mutually authenticate the EAP 
peer and the EAP server and KDK is used to derive other necessary keys. At the end of 
Phase 1, the outer master session key (MSK) derived from the KDK, peer nonce, and 
more such as ou t e r MSK = k e y _ d e r i v e  (KDK, RAND_P, ...) in Figure 3-2. The 
outer MSK will be used as one of these inputs for deriving MSK after a successful 
authentication is made.
All MSKs o f EAP-AES-PSK must be derived in the algorithm in Figure 3-2.
k e y  d e r i v e  ( kd k ,  r a n d  p ,  .. ) {
h a s h [16]
c o u n t e r  = 1
a e s  1 2 8 ( kdk ,  r a n d  p , h a s h ,  ...)
h a s h  A= c o u n t e r
a e s  128 ( kdk ,  h a s h ,  ...)
h a s h  A= c o u n t e r + +
f o r  i  = 0 t o  3
h a s h  A= c o u n t e r
a e s  1 2 8 ( kd k ,  h a s h ,  m s k [ i  * 1 6 ] ,
h a s h  A= c o u n t e r + +
}
Figure 3-2: Key Derive Algorithm in EAP-AES-PSK [5]
17
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Phase 2 performs further authentication in the initially-established AES secure 
tunnel from Phase 1. Unlike EAP-TLS-PSK, EAP-AES-PSK does not employ the EAP- 
TLV method to further authenticate EAP identity. At the conclusion of Phase 2, inner 
MSK is derived from KDK, peer secret (i.e., password), and more such i nne rMSK = 
k e y _ d e r i v e  (KDK, p a s s w o r d ,  ...). After successful authentication is made, 
MSK is derived from KDK, the concatenation of the first 8 bytes o f outer and inner 
MSKs, and more such as MSK = k e y _ d e r i v e  (KDK, o u t e r M S K [ 0 .  . 7 ]  | |
i nne rMSK [ 0 . .  7 ] , ...). MSK is to protect subsequent data. For more secure
communication, MSK is needed to update in timely manner. For instance, every round 
trip both the server and the client renew the MSK to protect subsequent data.
3.2 EAP-AES-PSK Message Flows and Packet Format
The typical packet format of the EAP-AES-PSK messages would have the 
appearance as is described in Figure 3-3. The first byte of the EAP-AES-PSK packet 
indicates Request, Response, Success, or Failure. The second byte indicates message 
identifier for each round trip between a server and a peer. After each round trip, the 
identifier should be updated to the next available identifier from 0 to 255. The next two 
bytes contain the total length of the EAP-AES-PSK packet. The next byte is for the EAP 
type field. EAP-AES-PSK should set this value to 255 as this is an experimental EAP 
method. The next byte is for flags. The subsequent bytes are for data. Thus, EAP-AES- 
PSK needs at least 6 bytes for the header.
18
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Total Length of Packet / 
2 bytes
Identifier /1  byte




Flags /1  byte
M = More fragment 
R = Reserved 
R = Reserved 
R = Reserved 
R = Reserved 
R = Reserved
V = Major Version = 1
V = Minor Version = 0
Figure 3-3: EAP-AES-PSK Packet Format
EAP-AES-PSK, as described in Section 3.1, may consist o f two primary phases of 
message flows. EAP-AES-PSK standard authentication is comprised of four messages, 
i.e., two round trips; see Figure 3-4. EAP-AES-PSK assumes that the pre-shared key 
(PSK) is already known only to the EAP peer and EAP sever and that the distribution of 
the PSK is outside of the scope of the EAP-AES-PSK mechanism. Note that ‘||’ within 
Figure 3-4 means concatenation.
19
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.
i A P -R espon se  PSK2 (M ags |R A M ) S | i \ l At P | l l )  P)
FAP-H ei|ues l.  PSK 3 (Flags| R A M )  S |P t  H A N M t l .  S)





F A I '-R eq u es t  C. IX (prom pt user ill & passw ord)  
FAP-K csponse.  t i  I t '  (user ill & passw ord)
►
F A P -S u ccess  or  Failure
■M
K A P -S u eee sso r  Failure
Figure 3-4: EAP-AES-PSK Authentication Message Exchanges
In the EAP-AES-PSK method, the first message sent by the server to the peer 
contains:
• An EAP-Request with EAP-Type=EAP-AES-PSK;
. Flags : MRRRRRVV;
20
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- M = More fragments
- R = Reserved (must be zero)
- R = Reserved (must be zero)
- R = Reserved (must be zero)
- R = Reserved (must be zero)
- R = Reserved (must be zero)
- V = 1 (major version)
- V = 0 (minor version)
• The stated server identity (ID_S); and
• A server 16-byte random challenge (RAND_S).
The second message is sent by the peer to the server containing:
• An EAP-Response with EAP-Type=EAP-AES-PSK;
• Flags: MRRRRRVV (major version = 1);
• A notice that it will authenticate to the server by proving that it is able to 
compute a particular Message Authentication Code (MAC_P), which is 
a function of the two challenges and AK:
MAC_P = CMAC-AES-128(AK, I D _ P | | I D _ S | | R A N D _ S | |  
RAND_P) ;
• A peer 16-byte random challenge (RAND P); and
• The stated peer identity (ID_P).
Like EAP-PSK [5], Authentication Key (AK) is used to mutually authenticate the 
EAP peer and the EAP server. AK is a static long-lived key derived from the PSK. 
Elowever, AK is not a session key.
The third message is sent by the server to the peer containing:
• An EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-AES-PSK;
• Flags: MRRRRRVV (major version = 1);
21
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• A notice that it will authenticate to the peer by proving that it is able to 
compute another MAC (MAC_S), which is a function of the peer’s 
challenge and AK: MAC_S = CMAC-AES-128 (AK, ID_S | | 
RAND_P) ; and
• An established protected channel (PCHANNEL_S) to:
- Confirm that it has derived session keys (at least the TEK); and
- Give a protected result indication of the authentication.
PCHANNEL_S is an encrypted message by AES encryption with TEK that 
contains information about Phase 1 authentication result. If  the client is able to decrypt 
PCHANNEL_S, the server verifies the client’s identity since TEK is derived directly 
from PSK and never transported over the Internet.
The fourth message is sent by the peer to the server containing:
• An EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-AES-PSK;
• Flags: MRRRRRVV (major version = 1); and
• A notice that the establishment of the protected channel 
(PCHANNEL P) is complete to:
- Confirm that it has derived session keys (at least the TEK); and
- Give a protected result indication of the authentication.
PCHANNEL_P is an encrypted message by AES encryption with TEK that 
contains information about Phase 1 authentication result. If the server is able to decrypt 
PCHANNEL_P, the client verifies the server’s identity since TEK is derived directly 
from PSK and never transported over the Internet.
22
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The internal method (in Phase 2) can be any other EAP method, such as EAP- 
GTC, and will allow for devices to establish safe authentication using the EAP-AES-PSK 
method. For instance, the internal method is encrypted by AES 128 encryption.
Figure 3-4 shows messages 5 through 8 are engaged in the exchange of user 
credentials using EAP-Generic Token Card (EAP-GTC) [2] exchanges. EAP-GTC has a 
data field in the Request includes a displayable message and a length of the packet of 
EAP-GTC is determined by adding message length to EAP-GTC header length. A 
Response must reply to the Request. We assume message 5 through 6 contain typical 
EAP header in Figure 3-3 with an EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-AES- 
PSK.
The fifth message is sent by the server to the peer containing:
• An EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-GTC; and
• A displayable message that prompts user id and password.
The sixth message is sent by the peer to the server containing:
• An EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-GTC; and
• A response to the Request.
Both the seventh and eighth messages are sent by the server to the peer 
containing:
• An EAP-Success or Failure with no data.
Even though the seventh and eighth messages are exactly the same packets, we 
still need to send the eighth message to satisfy the definition of successful authentication. 
Successful authentication is defined in this document as involving both authentication
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and authorization; even though the peer may pass authentication to the server, the peer 
may not access the server due to policy reasons. Thus, we need to send the eighth 
message although the message is a repeat of the previous seventh message. For instance, 
a peer has a basic service right on a server and the peer tries to access a premium service 
on the server. The peer probably passes the authentication, but not the authorization. In 
the case, the server sends EAP-Success within seventh message and EAP-Failure within 
eighth message.
While the EAP-AES-PSK method appears to offer 8 message exchanges at the 
minimum, both the outer and inner EAP methods are established using PSK and AES. 
This speedier method is expected to minimize message exchange latency that is found in 
other methods, while maximizing the feature set of this method.
3.3 Features of EAP-AES-PSK
Table 3-1 summarizes the features that EAP-TLS-PSK and EAP-AES-PSK 
provides. Both EAP methods propose tunneling support within EAP-PSK. The last 
column shows that EAP-AES-PSK brings fewer message exchanges between the client 
and server as compared to the EAP-TLS-PSK method. Details o f the features are shown 
in Section 3.4.
Table 3-1: Features of Pre-Shared Key Methods




By use of TLV Flags ‘More 
Fragment’ bit
Yes
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Table 3-1 Continued
Fast Reconnection Yes Yes
Key Strength 128 bit 128 bit
Inherited from EAP-PSK Inherited from EAP-PSK
Minimum # of 11 8
Messages Exchanges Phase 1 (4) + Phase 2 (7) Phase 1 (4) + Phase 2 (4)
Tunnel Support Yes Yes
TLS tunnel AES tunnel
Difficulty of 
Implementation
Harder than EAP-AES-PSK Easier than EAP-TLS-PSK
3.4 EAP-AES-PSK Supporting Aspects
This section explains details o f EAP-AES-PSK supporting aspects such as 
fragmentation, channel binding, fast reconnection, key strength, number of message 
exchanges, and tunnel support.
3.4.1 Fragmentation
The ideal EAP method supports fragmentation and reassembly. As RFC3748 
states, EAP methods should support fragmentation and reassembly if EAP packets can 
exceed the minimum Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of 1020 bytes [2], 
Fragmentation in EAP-TLS-PSK can be done through the use o f flags within the TLV in 
Phase 2 only.
EAP-AES-PSK has its own 1 byte flags field such as MRRRRRVV in Figure 3-3. 
If the M bit is 1 in the received EAP packet, there will be more data. If following the size 
o f the data is larger than the minimum MTU, M in the flags is set to 1. However
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fragmentation and reassembly may be needed only in Phase 2 o f EAP-AES-PSK. Since 
Phase 1 of EAP-AES-PSK is defined to support fragmentation and reassembly in its 
definition, MTU sizes of EAP-AES-PSK packets will not exceed 1020 bytes when 
normally transmitted in a network.
3.4.2 Channel Binding
The verification within an EAP method of integrity-protected channel properties 
is the process o f channel binding. For instance, endpoint identifiers within an EAP 
method can be compared to stored values (in AAA service systems).
EAP-AES-PSK uses an EAX mode o f operation, an authenticated-encryption with 
associated data mode of operation for block ciphers, to provide channel binding as stated 
in Section 2.2.3 o f EAP-PSK [5]. We explained earlier how EAP-AES-PSK achieves 
channel binding in Section 3.2.
3.4.3 Fast Reconnection
The ability to create a new or refreshed security association, in the case where a 
security association has been previously established, in a more efficient manner or in a 
smaller number of round-trips is the goal of fast reconnection. Fast reconnection is 
optional in EAP-AES-PSK since, by having fast reconnection, EAP-AES-PSK saves one 
message round trip.
The server and peer must minimally cache the server and peer nonces, but not 
master secret, in order to have fast reconnection within EAP-AES-PSK. The master 
secret will be regenerated from the pre-shared key, server and peer nonce, and AES 
ciphersuite. The peer attempts to resume a session by sending an encrypted message
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along with peer nonce from a previous session. The message should be encrypted using 
Transient EAP Key (TEK) derived from the pre-shared key and the AES ciphersuite. If 
the server has a matched peer nonce and is able to decrypt the message, the server will 
respond by sending an encrypted message to inform the peer o f the server’s successful 
verification of the peer. Then, EAP-AES-PSK Authentication Phase 1 establishes a 
secure tunnel and the conversation continues on to Phase 2. An example of fast 
reconnection message exchanges is shown in Section 4.2 that presents verification of 
EAP-AES-PSK functionality.
3.4.4 Key Strength
Following RFC3748 directives, if  the method derives keys, then the effective key 
strength must be estimated. This estimate is meant for potential users o f the method to 
determine if the keys produced are strong enough for the intended application. Since the 
keys within EAP-AES-PSK are derived by AES 128 ciphersuite like the EAP-PSK 
method, EAP-AES-PSK has the same key strength as EAP-PSK, which is 128 bit. 
However, the key strength of EAP-AES-PSK can be upgraded to 196 or 256 bit by 
replacing AES algorithm function. No one can be able to tell how long any cryptographic 
algorithm including the AES algorithm will last secure regardless key strength. As 
following National Institute o f Standards and Technology (NIST) [1], AES algorithm
-JO  C*7
approximately has 3.4 x 10 possible 128-bit keys, 6.2 x 10 possible 192-bit keys, and
1.1 x 1077 possible 256-bit keys.
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3.4.5 Number of Message Exchanges
This indicates the number o f message exchanges between a client and a server. 
EAP-AES-PSK has 8 message exchanges required in a normal configuration, while EAP- 
TLS-PSK needs 11 message exchanges to establish a proper secure connection. Both 
EAP-AES-PSK and EAP-TLS-PSK need 4 message exchanges in Phase 1, but EAP- 
AES-PSK requires only 4 message exchanges in Phase 2 while EAP-TLS-PSK requires 7 
message exchanges. Since EAP-AES-PSK does not require using Type Length Value 
(TLV) for crypto-binding in Phase 2, EAP-AES-PSK has 3 less message exchanges than 
EAP-TLS-PSK has.
3.4.6 Tunnel Support
Unlike EAP-TLS-PSK, EAP-AES-PSK uses Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [1] instead o f Transport Layer Security (TLS). AES published by the NIST, is 
known to provide strong encryption and authentication. EAP-AES-PSK supports strong 
encryption to prevent eavesdropping and mutual authentication and to guarantee that user 
credentials are transmitted over legitimate networks. In the EAP-AES-PSK method, the 
fifth to the seventh exchanged messages are protected by AES encryption tunnel support. 
Section 3.2 explains how this works and Section 4.2 illustrates an example of actual 
messages in communication.
3.5 Protections Against Security Risks
Typical attacks on Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) 
mechanisms include the dictionary attack, replay attack, and Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) attack as well as re-keying issues. Extensible Authentication Protocols (EAP)
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such as EAP-AES-PSK in SASL provides greater protection against the protections 
against those previously listed attacks based on the designs o f both SASL and EAP and 
their combined usage.
3.5.1 Dictionary Attack
A dictionary attack is a technique used to get around an authentication mechanism 
for accessing a computer system by guessing typical passwords. In many cases, the 
credential exchanges are open to attacks, such as dictionary attacks, on a password. This 
attack could occur in SASL mechanisms that authenticate users by user ID and password. 
For instance, in Figure 3-5, the intruder guesses on Bob’s password that matches with 
Bob’s ID to gain access to Alice’s system.





Figure 3-5: Dictionary Attack 
EAP methods in SASL create a secured Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
tunnel between the client and the authentication server first. Some legacy SASL 
mechanisms, such as password based-authentication methods, could be used to
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authenticate a client. Since user credential data transmission is performed only within a 
protected tunnel, SASL incorporating EAP methods is safe from the dictionary attack.
3.5.2 Replay Attack
Attackers could obtain a message from a legitimate user with accesses into a 
network and replay that message later. This attack is called the replay attack. Replay 
attack causes unauthorized authentication or denial of service (DoS) [19].
The authentication process in EAP-AES-PSK is based not only on Pre-Shared key 
(PSK), but also on nonces such as server and client random numbers. EAP-AES-PSK 
server and clients exchange their nonces by including within the first and second 
messages o f EAP-AES-PSK. Thus, the intruder will not gain successful authentication 
even if the intruder captures a message and resends to the server during the authentication 
process. The current server nonce will be not same as the server nonce from the last 
authentication process. Therefore, SASL incorporating EAP methods are safe from the 
replay attack.
3.5.3 Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack
Some mechanisms in SASL define authentication as a one-way action, such as a 
simple clear text password mechanism, PLAIN, although Generic Security Services 
Application Program Interface (GSSAPI [16]) [18], an application programming interface 
for programs to obtain security services [10], provide mutual authentication that uses 
Kerberos V. For example, when a client logs onto a network, only the server requires the 
client authentication. Because of one-way authentication, an attacker who resides 
between a client and a server can participate in the login exchange without the knowledge
30
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Figure 3-6: Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack
Typically MITM attack happens when mutual authentication is not performed. 
However, SASL incorporating EAP methods do mutual authentication between a client 
and a server. For instance, EAP-AES-PSK authenticates mutually via sending and 
receiving message 3 and 4 that contain PCHANNEL_S and PCHANNEL_P, encrypted 
messages by Advance Encryption Standard (AES) encryption. If the client is able to 
decrypt PCHANNEL_S message from the server, the server achieves verifying the 
client’s identity because TEK, a key to encrypt or decrypt a message, is derived directly 
from PSK and never transported over the Internet. If  the server is able to decrypt 
PCHANNEL P, the client achieves verifying the client’s identity. Thus, SASL 
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3.5.4 Re-keying
The SASL framework does not provide re-keying services. Thus, cryptographic 
keys age and become insecure as they are used and as time goes by [9]. EAP generates 
keying materials, such as Master Session Key (MSK) and Extended Master Session Key 
(EMSK), during the authentication process. MSK, which is at least 64 octets in length, is 
a keying material that is derived between the client and the server and carried by the EAP 
method. The EMSK is extended from MSK and is reserved for future uses that are not yet 
defined [2]. Secure EAP methods such as EAP-AES-PSK renew MSK in time manner. 
For instance, EAP-AES-PSK updates keys every round trip between a server and a peer.
If SASL uses EAP keying services, future re-keying services o f EAP will be 
automatically extended into the SASL mechanism and allow SASL incorporating EAP 
methods to support stronger cryptographic keys.
3.5.5 Data Encryption
Existing SASL, as defined, does not strongly encrypt messages in a 
communication between a client and a server. Standalone SASL only provides a 64 bit 
encryption scheme. Thus, attackers could easily sniff messages in the communication by 
using network protocol analyzers.
EAP in SASL solves the data encryption issue. Data in EAP-AES-PSK is 
encrypted by AES 128 ciphersuite or higher. EAP generates MSK after a successful 
authentication thus the M SK is used in AES 128 ciphersuite to encrypt data. Therefore, 
SASL incorporating EAP provides secure data transfer.
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CHAPTER 4
VERIFICATIONS
Currently, there are two publicly available Simple Authentication and Secure 
Layer (SASL) libraries available: Cyrus SASL library from Carnegie Mellon University 
and the GNU SASL library. In this project, Cyrus SASL library was selected randomly 
and used as part o f the implementation as well as Hostapd and Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA) supplicant [15] for SASL and EAP frames respectively. In Chapter 3 we proposed 
a new Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method, EAP - Advanced Encryption 
Standard - Pre-Shared Key (EAP-AES-PSK). EAP-AES-PSK is successfully built on the 
SASL library and used for simple file transfer. This chapter details the project outcomes 
and evaluates the result.
4.1 Outcomes
This project proposes to incorporate EAP into SASL to enhance the security of 
SASL and to provide a pathway for the easy incorporation of future EAP enhancements 
into SASL. The practical details on how to merge EAP into a SASL application source 
code library is stated in Appendix B, including documentation about SASL incorporating 
EAP such as implementation of SASL incorporating EAP: EAP interface, 
implementation of SASL incorporating EAP-PSK, implementation o f SASL
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incorporating EAP-AES-PSK, SASL Application: basic file transfer application requiring 
authentication, and a general SASL installation user guide, and a basic file transfer SASL 
application user guide.
4.2 Evaluation
Evaluation o f this project contains three parts: verification of functionality of a 
SASL application incorporating EAP, arguments to show how common security risks are 
addressed, and a performance evaluation. In Section 3.5, we already argue that SASL 
incorporating EAP will reduce or prevent the considerable security risks such as the 
dictionary attack, replay attack, and Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack as well as re­
keying issues.
4.2.1 Verification of Functionality of a SASL Application incorporating EAP
The outcomes specified in Section 4.1 above are performed for functionalities and 
secure data encryption by using network protocol analyzers. The network protocol 
analyzer examined transmissions to verify that the messages in the communication are 
secure. For instance, captured messages between a client and a server in a SASL 
application was compared with a result that we expect what the captured messages should 
be.
The configuration of EAP-AES-PSK must be preplanned before we use EAP- 
AES-PSK. Table 4-1 is a configuration example o f EAP-AES-PSK. Both a server and a 
client must set the Pre-Shared Key and ID respectively to be “thisistemporarykey” and 
“EAP-AES-PSK_server/ EAP-AES-PSK_client.” The client needs to provide a user ID
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and a user password for Phase 2 that will be used in the inner method, i.e., “userl” and 
“passl.”




User ID for Phase2 N/A userl
User Password for Phase2 N/A passl
The following boxed messages in octet form were captured during a SASL 
incorporating EAP-AES-PSK communicated. Each line starts with a 7 digit line number 
in octet form followed by 16 bytes, such as ‘od  - x ’ format, in UNIX-like machine 
format. Note that ‘||’ means concatenation and ‘n ’ (in ‘[n]’) represents a number of 
byte(s), i.e., [3] means 3 bytes.
When EAP-AES-PSK is initialized, both the server and the client derive 
Authentication Key (AK) and Key Derivation Key (KDK) from the MSK above.
AK [16]:
00 00 00 0  e b 6 9  f 5e C  5 9d c  l c d 8  2 f l l  c d 36  6 f 2 9  3 f d 3
KDK [16]:
00 00 0 00 0  3 c 4 b  3 4 0 c  e 8 e l  3780 9 f 5 8  f 8 b e  b b a c  8d04
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First message (server -> client):
(EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] 
RAND S [16] || ID S [18]):
0000000 0101 0028 f  f  02 2da5 f  99e f  c l 8 162b 2 a d d
0000020 5534 7ba5 f  88d 4541 5 02 d 4145 5 32 d 5053
0000040 4 b 5 f 7365 7276 6572
EAP-Request, EAP-Response, EAP-Success, and EAP-Failure are defined to 
values 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Second message (client -> server):
(EAP-Response [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] 
RAND S [16] || RAND P [16] || MAC_P [16] || ID_P [18]):
0000000 0201 0048 f  f  02 2 da 5 f  99e f c l 8 162b 2 a d d
0000020 5534 7ba5 f  88d l a 4 c b 3 3 d 8 f  83 5 4 0 d l e 9 6
0000040 077b e e 3 a 2 d f  a aObe d f  f e e543 821a c d d d
0000060 c a 9 c 0c52 5a34 4541 502d 4145 5 3 2 d 5053
0000080 4 b 5 f 63 6c 6965 6e7 4
Third message (server client):
(EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] 
RAND S [16] || MAC S [16] || PCHANNEL S):
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0 000000 0102 003b f  f  02 2 da 5 f  99e f  c l 8 162b 2 a d d
0000020 5534 7ba5 f  88d 3306 7 a 2 c 5 2 f e 7 2 d f 33d0
0000040 e 80 9 d 8 3 d e 8 d a 0000 0000 c 7 3 d 0 4dc c807
0000060 I f  9c 6e59 0e60 9 c dc 1 3 a e e d
Fourth message (client server):
(EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] 
RAND S [16] || PCHANNEL P):
0 000000 0202 002b f  f  02 2 da 5 f  99e f  c l 8 162b 2 a d d
0000020 5534 7ba5 f  88d 0000 0001 4d59 d 5 c l 0362
0 000040 0817 7c68 c053 4a 2 b e472 bb
Fifth message (server client):
(EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] 
nonce [4] || tag [16] || EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Length [2] || EAP-GTC [1] 
“UserID? Password?”):
0 000000 0103 0032 f  f  02 0000 0000 2 a 4 f e c 4 a eb7  3
0 000020 7123 e a f  3 9073 7 01e 0 4 a e 6 cb e c 0a4 4 8 f e
0000040 c 8 a 3 8 a 2 c 64d2 bb4  0 9 c b a d e b  8 a 680 7583
0000060 c8 6b
Nonce and tag are needed to establish the AES tunnel. Nonce should be 16 bytes. 
The first 12 bytes are set to be zeros and only the last 4 bytes are to be defined. Thus,
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from the second EAP-Request of the fifth message is where the inner EAP method starts 
encryption.
Sixth message (client server):
(EAP-Response [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] || 
nonce [4] || tag [16] || EAP-Response [1] || identifier [1] || Length [2] || EAP-GTC [1] || 
“userl/passl”):
0000000 0203 002b f  f  02 0000 0001 0a07 c l c c 67 f b
0 000020 b 4 7 c 0 00a 3c45 e 500 b 20 0 3 93e 8 2 c d 2cd7
0 000040 2 d b a 41d7 cdlO 7327 b82  6 75
Seventh message (server -> client):
(EAP-Response [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1]):
0000000  0304 0006 f f 0 2
EAP-AES-PSK needs 8 message exchanges. However EAP-AES-PSK within the 
SASL framework does not require the eighth message, which is exactly the same as the 
seventh message. We may send the seventh message again for the last message, but it 
wastes time and is unnecessary because the SASL framework is required to send 
“S A S L O K ”, indicating successful authentication is made, and that can replace the 
eighth m essage o f  EAP-AES-PSK in the EAP framework.
After successful authentication in SASL incorporating EAP (using EAP-AES- 
PSK), the Master Session Key (MSK) is derived to protect subsequent data from 
manipulating the outer and inner MSKs using KDK.
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Outer MSK [64]:
0 000000 33d8 4480 e 8 d a 64 4 f eO 90 7 8c6 0 a 5 d 97c6
0 000020 534 f b 7a 7 d8 99 6 a f d 62c8 5 9 3 d 7 6e0 3635
0 000040 8896 8 f  I f 9 d aa b4 63 6dbc 7 f  f  0 f  3 68 2d52
0 000060 c d d b e ! 4  6 5 9 f e e 8 4 d f e d d 3 f e d 15e4 6d4d
Inner MSK [64]:
0 000000 0440 e f  7 6 6652 9b2 9 42a8 cbdO 4946 5891
0000020 8722 f  10 9 0 2 e f 5062 0b60 8859 4 a d e 4 6c5
0000040 2bdb 02a0 a 8 7 a d2 4 2 e 6d8 3421 0c82 b 4 3 a
0000060 4 d e f 7612 a 6 b d 0850 d e e 2 2 4 a d b27D f b 3 2
MSK [64]:
0 000000 c a 9 9 f  Oec 8 a l 3 c908 a f  f  9 6 8 f  5 2 4cb 9 e b l
0000020 4 40c d 4 0 a 77b0 3373 c f  Oe 2 2 dd 8353 5 3 0 c
0000040 7e92 9611 3543 8 8 f  8 f  90b 2077 9193 0e7 7
0 000060 5 f  87 6561 c c d l 481b ed58 c a e 5 e 9 a l d 3 1 c
The following two extra messages are from fast reconnection, described in 
Section 3.4, after the successful authentication above. Both the server and the client saved 
their nonces.
First message in fast reconnection (client server):
(EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] || 
RAND P [16] || PCHANNEL P):
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0 000000 0107 002b f  f  02 l a 4 c b 3 3 d 8 f  83 54 Od l e 9 6
0 000020 077b e e 3 a 2 d f a 0000 0000 c7 3d 0 4dc c807
0 000040 I f  9c 6e59 0e60 9 c d c 1 3 a e e d
Second message in fast reconnection (server -> client):
(EAP-Request [1] || identifier [1] || Total Length [2] || EAP-AES-PSK [1] || flags [1] 
RAND S [16] || PCHANNEL S):
0 000000 0207 002b f  f  02 2da5 f  99e f c l 8 162b 2 a d d
0 000020 5534 7 ba5 f  88d 0000 0001 4d59 d 5 c l 0362
0000040 0817 7c68 c 053 4 a 2b e 472 bb
If the server and the client are able to decrypt the message that is encrypted by 
each other, then EAP-AES-PSK Authentication Phase 1 establishes a secure tunnel and 
the conversation continues on to Phase 2. Otherwise, both the server and the client start 
normal authentication.
4.2.2 Performance Evaluation 
Authentication Time Test (Access Time Test):
The authentication time test was executed on the SASL only-application (i.e., 
ANONYMOUS), SASL using EAP-PSK method, and SASL EAP-AES-PSK. Figure 4-1 
and Table 4-2 show the amount o f  time needed to perform authentication in 
ANONYMOUS, EAP-PSK, and EAP-AES-PSK. Note that all performance tests were 
executed on machines with 500 MHz CPU/256 MB memory and 700 MHz CPU/256 MB 
memory for the server side and the client side respectively.
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The server is always running and waiting for a client connection. Thus, server 
authentication time is measured from the time a new client connects to the time the client 
disconnects. Client authentication time is measured from the time the client initializes to 
the time the client ends.
The authentication time for the each method are measured in both the controlled 
environment and the un-controlled environment. Figure 4-1 and Table 4-2 shows both the 
results from both the controlled experiment and the uncontrolled experiment. The 
controlled environment is a test setup such as using two machines and a router in home 
network (or private network). In the controlled environment, the messages are never 
transported over Internet or public network. Thus, we can minimize the chance of un­
wanted variants affect on the authentication time. Internet is one o f the un-controlled 
environments where we cannot have all controls to maximize and to accurate test results. 
The test in the un-controlled environment was executed on one machine (a server), is at 
University of New Hampshire (UNH) and another machine (a client), is in Epsom, NH 
where is about 27 miles away from UNH over Internet.
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□  Server in the Un-Controlled Experiment B C lien t in the Un-Controlled Experiment
Figure 4-1: Authentication Time for Each Method
Table 4-2: 95% Confidence Level Authentication Time for each Method





Server 88.5±0.5 101±0.5 113±0.7
Client 27.7±0.4 38.1±0.4 40.4±0.4
Un-Controlled
Experiments
Server 290±6 450±27 467±16
Client 227±3 386±26 395±8
The authentication time in EAP-PSK and EAP-AES-PSK took longer compared
to the time in ANONYMOUS because ANONYMOUS only needs 2 message exchanges 
while EAP-PSK and EAP-AES-PSK requires 4 and 7 message exchanges along with 
AES encryption.
AES Encryption Time Test:
We need to know how much AES encryption time affects on the performance of 
SASL incorporating EAP-AES-PSK. EAP-AES-PSK, the new proposed EAP method, 
uses AES encryption to protect data communications after successful authentication.
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Figure 4-2 & Table 4-3 and Figure 4-3 & Table 4-4 show the completion time 
examined on SASL application incorporating EAP-AES-PSK in the controlled 
environment and the un-controlled environment respectively. The SASL application 
transfers different sizes of plain text and AES encrypted text files, such as 1 KB, 10 KB, 
100 KB and 1000 KB. The text of RFC2800, the one o f IETF standards, was randomly 
selected as a data file for the test and the file was truncated to satisfy the required file 
sizes; 1 KB, 10 KB, 100 KB and 1000 KB. This completion time tests measured the time 
from the authentication to the file transfer, which is the sum of the access time and the 
transfer time.
Both (a) and (b) in Figure 4-2 and 4-3 have 800 elements, such as 2 
(encrypted/plain text) x 4 (1, 10, 100, and 1000 KB) x 100 (trials). Since the completion 
time is similar, whether the file is encrypted or not in each different size, we see 4~5 
major horizontal lines. As file size increases, Both Figure 4-2 & Table 4-3 (from the 
controlled experiments) and Figure 4-3 & Table 4-4 (from the un-controlled experiments) 
show that AES encryption time does not increase much. As following Schneier’s AES 
performance test [21], the test exposes that AES algorithm performs efficiently even in 
large data, i.e., larger than 1 MB. AES algorithm can be coded in assembly for better 
performance in where needs to run fast [21]. Thus, SASL file transferring application 
incorporating EAP-AES-PSK takes an almost comparable amount o f time to transfer files 
from one system to the other as compared to the time to transfer plain text files.
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Figure 4-2: (a) Server Completion Time in the Controlled Environment, 
(b) Client Completion Time in the Controlled Environment
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Figure 4-3: (a) Server Completion Time in the Un-Controlled Environment, 
(b) Client Completion Time in the Un-Controlled Environment
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Table 4-3: 95% Confidence Level Completion Time in the Controlled Environment
Completion Time [ms] 
YFile size [KB]
1 10 100 1000
Server Plain Text 119±0.8 121±0.7 138±0.8 301±1.3
AES Encrypted Text 119±0.7 122±0.8 160±0.9 576±0.9
Client Plain Text 45.9±0.5 47.9±0.4 63.7±0.5 227±0.8
AES Encrypted Text 46.2±0.5 49.2±0.5 86.5±0.6 501±1.0
Table 4-4: 95% Confidence Level Completion Time in the Un-Controlled Environment
Completion Time [ms] 
Wile size [KB]
1 10 100 1000
Server Plain Text 456±5 540±5 2586±62 22692±172
AES Encrypted Text 456±9 577±15 2835±74 23363±240
Client Plain Text 402±5 484±5 2560±72 22556±165
AES Encrypted Text 402±7 521±15 2646±64 22806±161
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Authentication and access control of users are key functions to establish secure 
communication. However, successful authentication does not always occur over insecure 
network connections. Weak authentication methods are subject to the risks o f insecure 
communication such as dictionary attack, replay attack, and Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) 
attack.
In this thesis, we demonstrated the incorporation o f Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) into Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) to enhance the 
security of SASL and to provide a pathway for easy incorporation of future EAP 
enhancements into SASL in addition to the establishment of secure communication. 
Moreover, we proposed a new EAP method, EAP-Advanced Encryption Standard-Pre- 
Shared Key (EAP-AES-PSK) to provide strong authentication and implemented it on the 
Cyrus SASL library that is one o f the publicly available SASL implementations.
The evaluation of this thesis on the functionality of a SASL application 
incorporating EAP, the arguments to show how common security risks are addressed, and 
the performance evaluation shows that SASL incorporating EAP provides stronger 
security services. The performance test results demonstrated that AES encryption does
47
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not require much more time, and as a result it, this new EAP method, EAP-AES-PSK, 
can be used in transferring a large sized fde.
For the future, EAP-AES-PSK needs a more efficient way to re-authenticate since 
current re-authentication schemes reduce only 1 round trip. And interoperability with 
other EAP methods that use other encryptions is an additional concern that warrants 
further study.
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APPENDIX A 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting [RFC 3127]
AES Advanced Encryption Standard [FIPS 197]
AK Authentication Key
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [RFC 1994]
DoS Denial of Service
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC 3748]
EAP-GTC EAP-Generic Token Card [RFC 3748]
EAP-PSK EAP-Pre-Shared Key [RFC 4764]
EAP-TLS EAP-Transport Layer Security [RFC 2716]
EAP-TLS-PSK EAP- Transport Layer Security-Pre-Shared Key
EM SK Extended Master Session Key
GSSAPI Generic Security Services Application Program 
GSS-API) [RFC 1508]
Interface (also
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
KDK Key-Derivation Key
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Message Authentication Code, same as MIC
MIC Message Integrity Check, same as MAC 
Authentication Code)
(also Message
M ITM Man-In-The-Middle attack
MSK Master Session Key
PAP Password Authentication Protocol
POP Post Office Protocol
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
PRF Pseudo Random Function
PSK Pre-Shared Key
SASL Simple Authentication and Secure Layer [RFC 4422]
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SQL Structured Query Language
TEK Transient EAP Key
TLS Transport Layer Security [RFC 4346]
TLV T ype-Length-V alue
VPN Virtual Private Network
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
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APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENTS/USER GUIDES
This document is written to help users to install and to use CYRUS (SASL 
library) in the simplest way as well as to incorporate Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) into SASL. CYRUS could be integrated with DB such as SASLdb (gdbm, 
Sleepycat, ndbm), SQL (mySQL and PostgreSQL v7.2 or higher) to enable 
userlD/password.
B.l Cyrus Installation
* Note that some of the following steps require users to be a root.
** If you want to have SASL file transfer application incorporating EAP, do all 10 
steps. Otherwise, do only first seven steps.
Step 1 download cyrus-sasl-2.1.22 
Step 2 untar cyrus-sasl-2.1.22
Step 3 cd (directory it was untarred into) i.e., cyrus-sasl-2.1.22
Step 4 . / c o n f i g u r e
Step 5 make
Step 6 make i n s t a l l
Step 7 I n  - s  / u s r / l o c a l / l i b / s a s l 2  / u s r / l i b / s a s l 2  
Step 8 untar cyrus-sasl-2.1.22-eap.tar
Step 9 replace all files i n c l u d e / , l i b / ,  p l u g i n s / ,  a n d  s a m p l e /  
d i r e c t o r y  with files in c y r u s - s a s l - 2  . 1 .  2 2 - e a p /  directory 
Step 10 re-compile
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B.2 Cyrus usage of ANONYMOUS mechanism with file transfer
** Server side
Step 1 open terminal
Step 2 c d  c y r u s - s a s l - 2  . 1 .  2 2 / s a m p l e
Step 3 . / s e r v e r
Now a server waits for client connection.
** Client side
Step 1 open terminal
Step 2 c d  c y r u s - s a s l - 2  . 1 .  2 2 / s a m p l e
Step 3 . / c l i e n t  -m ANONYMOUS h o s t _ a d d r e s s
Step 4 enter user account i.e., "mkim" (from m k i m g l o c a l h o s t )
Step 5 enter file name 
After client transfers a file, it will terminate the program.
In order to use other authentication methods such as CRAM-MD5 and DIGEST-MD5, 
type . / c l i e n t  -m method__name h o s t _ a d d r e s s .
B.3 Cyrus Password Setup (using sasldb)
Password setup using SASLDB v.2
Step 1 / u s r / s b i n / s a s l p a s s w d 2  u s e r l D
Step 2 e n t e r  u s e r  p a s s w o r d
User ID and password will be saved on / e t c / s a s l d b 2
The script, / u s r / s b i n / s a s l d b l i s t u s e r s 2 ,  displays all users in the
SASLDB.
Password setup using SASLDB v .l
Step 1 /usr/sbin/saslpasswd userlD
Step 2 e n t e r  u s e r  p a s s w o r d
User ID and password will be saved on /  e t c / s a s l d b
The script, / u s r / s b i n / s a s l d b l i s t u s e r s ,  displays all users in the SASLDB.
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B.4 Add Mechanism Plugins
The following example explains how to add EAP-PSK. If you want to add other 
methods, replace EAP-PSK with the method name.
Step 1 Implement the following functions in p l u g i n s /  directory:
Step 1.1 Both client/server sides: add plugin__id
i.e., static const char plugin_id [ ] = "$Id: eappsk.c, v
1 . 1 1  yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss mel Exp $"
Step 1.2 Server sides
Step 1.2.1 initialize server mechanism - mechName_server_mech_new 
i.e., static int eappsk_server_mech_new (
void *glob_context  attribute ((unused)),
sasl_server_params_t *sparams,
const char *challenge  attribute ((unused)),
unsigned challen  attribute ((unused)),
void **conn_context);
Step 1.2.2 process server mechanism - mechName_server__mech_step 
i.e., static int eappsk_server_mech_step (
void *conn_context  attribute ((unused)),
sasl_server_params_t *params, 
const char *clientin, 
unsigned clientinlen, 
const char **serverout, 
unsigned *serveroutlen, 
sasl_out_params_t *oparams);
Step 1.2.3 fill up server mechanism plugins information - mechName_server 
plugins
i.e., static sasl_server_plug_t eappsk_server_plugins [ ] =
{
{
"EAPPSK", /* mech_name */
0, / * max s s f */
SASL_SEC_NOANONYMOUS, /* security^flags */ 
SASL_FEAT_WANT_CLIENT_FIRST
I SASL_FEAT_ALLOWS_PROXY, /* features */
NULL, /* glob_context */
&eappsk_server_mech_new, /* mech_new */
&eappsk_server_mech_step, /* mech step */
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NULL, /* mech dispose */
NULL, /* mech free */
NULL, /* setpass */
NULL, /* user query */
NULL, /* idle */
NULL, /* mech avail */
NULL /* spare */
}
};
Step 1.2.4 initialize server mechanism plugin - m e c h N a m e _ s e r v e r _  
p l u g _ _ i n i t  
i.e., i n t  e a p p s k _ s e r v e r _ p l u g _ i n i t  (
c o n s t  s a s l _ u t i l s _ t  * u t i l s ,  
i n t  m a x v e r s i o n ,  
i n t  * o u t _ v e r s i o n ,  
s a s l _ s e r v e r _ p l u g _ t  * * p l u g l i s t ,  
i n t  * p l u g c o u n t ) ;
Step 1.2.5 de-initialize server mechanism - mechName_se  r v e r _ m e c h  
_ d i s p o s e
Step 1.2.6 other functions: m e c h N a m e _ s e r v e r _ m e c h _ f  r e e ,
m e c h N a m e _ s e r v e r _ m e c h _ a v a i l
Step 1.3 Client side
Step 1.3.1 initialize client mechanism - m e c h N a m e _ c l i e n t _ m e c h _ n e w  
i.e., s t a t i c  i n t  e a p p s k _ c l i e n t _ m e c h _ n e w  (
v o i d  * g l o b _ c o n t e x t  a t t r i b u t e  ( ( u n u s e d ) ) ,
s a s l _ c l i e n t _ p a r a m s _ t  * p a r a m s ,  
v o i d  * * c o n n _ c o n t e x t ) ;
Step 1.3.2 process client mechanism - mechName_server_mech_step
i.e., s t a t i c  i n t  e a p p s k _ c l i e n t _ m e c h _ s t e p  ( 
v o i d  * c o n n _ c o n t e x t ,  
s a s l _ c l i e n t _ p a r a m s _ t  * p a r a m s ,
c o n s t  c h a r  * s e r v e r i n   a t t r i b u t e  ( ( u n u s e d ) ) ,
u n s i g n e d  s e r v e r i n l e n   a t t r i b u t e  ( ( u n u s e d ) ) ,
s a s l _ i n t e r a c t _ t  * * p r o m p t _ n e e d ,  
c o n s t  c h a r  * * c l i e n t o u t ,  
u n s i g n e d  * c l i e n t o u t l e n ,  
s a s l _ o u t _ p a r a m s _ t  * o p a r a m s ) ;
Step 1.3.3 fill up client mechanism plugins information - m e c h N a m e _ c l i e t n  
p l u g i n s
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i.e., static sasl_client_plug_t eappsk_client_plugins [ ]
{
{
"EAPPSK", /* mech_name */
0, /* max_ssf */
SASL_SEC_NOANONYMOUS, /* security_flags */
SASL_FEAT_WANT_CLIENT_FIRST 
I SASL_FEAT_ALLOWS_PROXY,/* features */
NULL, /* required_prompts
NULL, /* glob_context */
&eappsk_client_mech_new, /* mech_new */ 
&eappsk_client_mech_step, /* mech_step */ 
&eappsk_client_mech_dispose, /* mech_dispose * 
NULL, /* mech_free */
NULL, /* idle */
NULL, /* spare */
NULL /* spare */
}
};
Step 1.3.4 initialize client mechanism plugin - mechName_client_plug_ 
init





Step 1.3.5 de-initialize client mechanism - mechName_client_mech_ 
dispose
Step 1.3.6 other function: mechName_client_mech_f ree
Step 2 Call the following functions in application codes
Step 2.1 Server side
Step 2.1.1 go to the line s a s l _ s e r v e r _ i n i t  () is called
Step 2.1.2 call the fuction s a s l _ s e r v e r _ a d d _ p l u g i n  ()
i.e., s a s l _ s e r v e r _ a d d _ p l u g i n  ( "EAPPSK" ,
S e a p p s k  s e r v e r  p l u g  i n i t ) ;
Step 2.1.3 include the new mechanism
i.e., # i n c l u d e  " . . / p l u g i n s / e a p p s k . c "
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Step 2.2 Client side: Software engineers must call the following functions in 
application codes where locates in the directory s a m p l e /
Step 2.2.1 go to the line s a s l _ c l i e n t _ i n i t  () is called
Step 2.2.2 call the fuction sasl_client_add_plugin()
i.e., s a s l _ _ c l i e n t _ a d d _ p l u g i n  ("EAPPSK",
& e a p p s k _ c l i e n t _ p l u g _ i n i t ) ;
Step 2.2.3 include the new mechanism
i.e., # i n c l u d e  " . . / p l u g i n s / e a p p s k .  c "
Step 3 Modify the file configure in Cyrus directory
Step 3.1 search " - - e n a b l e - p l a i n "
Step 3.2 add the following code segment before the line you found
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  EAPPSK # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
# C he c k  w h e t h e r  - - e n a b l e - e a p p s k  o r  - - d i s a b l e - e a p p s k  
was  g i v e n .
i f  t e s t  " $ { e n a b l e _ e a p p s k + s e t }" = s e t ;  t h e n  
e n a b l e v a l = " $ e n a b l e _ e a p p s k "  
e a p p s k = $ e n a b l e v a l  
e l s e
e a p p s k = y e s
f i ;
EAPPAK_LIBS=""
i f  t e s t  " $ e a p p s k "  != n o ;  t h e n




e c h o  " $ a s _ m e : $LINENO: c h e c k i n g  EAPPSK" >&5 
e c h o  $ECHO_N " c h e c k i n g  E AP P SK . . .  $ECHO_C" >&6 
i f  t e s t  " $ e a p p s k "  != n o ;  t h e n  
e c h o  " $ a s _ m e : $LINENO: r e s u l t :  e n a b l e d "  >&5 
e c h o  " $ { ECHO_T}e n a b l e d "  >&6
SASL_MECHS="$SASL_MECHS l i b e a p p s k . l a "  
i f  t e s t  " $ e n a b l e _ s t a t i c "  = y e s ;  t h e n
SASL_STATIC_OBJS="$SASL_STATIC_OBJS e a p - p s k . o "
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SASL_STATIC_SRCS="$SASL_STATIC_SRCS . . / p l u g i n s / e a p ­
p s k  . c "
c a t  > > c o n f d e f s . h  <<\_ACEOF 
# d e f i n e  STATIC_EAPPSK 
_ACEOF
f i
e l s e
e c h o  " $ a s _ m e : $LINENO: r e s u l t :  d i s a b l e d "  >&5 
e c h o  " $ {ECHO_T}d i s a b l e d "  >&6 
f  i
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
Add new mechanisms on the file, M a k e f i l e . am, in the directory 
p l u g i n s /
Make sure that you re-compile for all the changes 
Make sure that the directory / u s r / l i b / s a s l 2 /  contains the new 
mechanism library
i.e., l o c a t e  l i b e a p p s k . l a  
l o c a t e  l i b e a p p s k . s o
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